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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
executed. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, supra. In Nebraska filing was in-
effective in either situation until the legislature acted. Now filing gives the credi-
tor protection against third party claimants in all cases. See American State Bk.
v. Keller, 112 Neb. 761, 200 N.W. 999 (1924); cf. Thcmas v. Prairie Home Co-op
Co., supra, and NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §36-301, cited therein. The Wisconsin
court has compromised to some extent with its declared position. The court has
recognized that a landlord may have a lien in the crop of his tenant to secure the
payment of rent where he has bargained for "title" in the crop. Layng v. Stout,
155 Wis. 553, 145 N.W. 227 (1914). And a creditor who has furnished seed to
the debtor may bargain for "title" in the crop and acquire a lien therein. Lanyon
v. Woodward, 55 Wis. 652, 13 N.W. 863 (1882). These compromises indicate that
the court has not always been satisfied with the sweeping declaration of policy
stated in most of the cases. Whether the parties have literally bargained for
"title" ought not have any effect upon the decision unless the particular case on
its facts is typical of a class of cases which deserve special adjustments as is,
perhaps, true in the landlord cases, particularly if the landlord has himself har-
vested the crop. Perhaps there is no commercial demand in Wisconsin for the
working out of some acceptable scheme for this type of financing. Certainly the
hands of the court are so tied by the earlier decisions that no satisfactory scheme
can be worked out without the aid of the legislature. And no statute merely
purporting to make "valid" mortgages on after-grown crops will be sufficient.
If the legislature should act at all it should anticipate some of the administrative
problems that will necessarily arise and make literal provision for their solutions.
VERNON X. MILLER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-GRosS SALES TAx.-The plaintiffs, corpora-
tions, partnerships, and individuals, conducting stores in the state of Kentucky,
brought four suits in the federal court to enjoin as unconstitutional a graduated
gross sales tax. Ky. Laws, (1930) c. 149, p. 475. Interlocutory injunctions were
issued but the district court dismissed the bills being of the opinion that the pro-
cedure set up in the act for the recovery of taxes (payment under protest and
suit against the auditor of public accounts) provided an adequate remedy at law.
Upon appeal in the case of Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis et al., 287 U.S. 9,
53 Sup. Ct. 68, 77 L. ed. 135 (1932), the decrees were reversed on the ground that
the inability of the state treasury to meet the warrants outstanding in the hands
of those who had successfully contested payment vitiated the remedy at law.
The district court then found the remedy at law inadequate but sustained the
act and dismissed the bills. Stewart Dry Goods Cnmtpany v. John B. Lewis et al,
7 Fed. Supp. 438 (D.C.W.D. Ky. 1933), 8 Fed. Supp. 396 (D.C.W.D. and E.D.
Ky. 1934). On appeal to the Supreme Court in a six-three decision, Held, that the
statute was unconstitutional for the reason that the graduation feature of the
tax denied equal protection of the law as assured by the fourteenth amendment.
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis et al., 55 Sup. Ct. 525, 79 L. ed. 539 (1935).
The appellee asserted that increased sales result in greater profits per unit
sold, thereby effecting greater ability to pay taxes; and that the tax graduation
levels off at a fixed amount before this increase of profit per unit ceases and
the act is therefore not discriminatory. This contention persuaded the supreme
court of the state of Kentucky to uphold the act. Moore et al. v. State Board
of Charities et al., 239 Ky. 729, 40 S.W. (2nd) 349 (1931).
The court states that a tax on gross sales is, in fact, a tax on the article sold
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and the operation of the statute in question is as unjustifiable as would be a tax
on tangible personal property graduated upward on each additional unit owned.
To refute the contention that he who sells more is in receipt of greater propor-
tional profit the court quotes from the case of the United States Glue Company
v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328, 38 Sup. Ct. 499, 62 L. ed. 1135 (1918),
which distinguishes between the effect of a tax measured by gross sales and one
measured by net income. In the instant case the court points out that the ex-
istence of large gross sales does not always indicate a high net profit, and that
a tax on gross sales might spell the difference between a net loss and a net profit.
This was exemplified by the actual experience of one of the petitioners who
would have sustained a loss had the tax been enforced. In reconciling the holding
of the instant case with that of State Tax Co'nissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S.
527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540, 75 L. ed. 1248 (1931), where a tax on chain stores graduated
with the number of unit stores operated was held valid, the court says that the
graduation in that case was justified by the advantages incidental to the manage-
ment of multiple store systems. In the instant case the court has no recognition
for the advantages incidental to and based on a large number of sales rather
than unit stores. The majority opinion concludes with the remark that nothing
had been presented to show that the result sought in the instant act could not
be accomplished by a flat tax on sales or a graduated profit tax.
In presenting the dissenting opinion, Justice Cardozo points out that the
great bulk of the evidence seems to indicate that up to a certain point the profits
of a business increase in a greater proportion than do the gross sales and relies
on such cases as State Tax Commissioner v. Jackson, supra, (reconciled in tho
majority opinion) and Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U.S. 269, 46
Sup. Ct. 110, 70 L. ed. 270 (1925) (tax graduated according to the number of
cases of salmon packed) to sustain the proposition that graduated taxes have
been levied on enterprises on the basis of size alone with no reference to profits.
The Justice quotes economic authorities to show that a flat tax is unsatisfactory
because the small business man has greater difficulty in passing it on to the con-
sumer than has the larger enterprise, and points out that the gross sales item
is far easier to obtain and assess than the elusive and easily camouflaged net
income figure.
In balancing the opinions, majority and dissenting, it becomes apparent that
the instant case was not decided so much upon legal theory as upon the beliefs
of the members of the court as to certain economic facts. The majority holds, in
short, that gross sales is not positively indicative of ability to pay a tax and
points to the experience of one of the petitioners. The minority concedes that
some inequality and some injustice may attend the levying of the tax but holds
that the law regards not invariable sequences but probabilities and tendencies.
Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 329, 46 L. ed. 569, 22 Sup. Ct. 382 (1901). Of this
case it can be said that it is another in that long and confusing series of de-
cisions necessitated by the efforts of the states to pass income taxes under the
mask of license, revenue, and sales taxes.
ERNEST 0. EISENBERG
CONTRACTS-ILLEGAL-UNENFORCEABILTY.-The plaintiff, a band director of
considerable reputation, sued for money due under a contract in which he al-
lowed the defendant the exclusive use of his name and the name of his band in
the advertising of the defendant's band instruments. Plaintiff also agreed under
the contract to include in all his own announcements the statement that he
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